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Abstract
Pembonan IY/TC | | SEtenber 2001 nkh neXahirkan sebuah stigna
terbadE Islan,laitu teroris dan al-paeda nbagai tertad*b. Di Asia
Tengara, kasus Bon Balijuga nengidentfrkasi daryajaringan al-paeda
1g km*dian dikenal dengan ama Jarua'ab Isknfob. Banyak teorilang
dikenukakan oleh ilmuwan-ilnawan di furbagai bekban dunia tentang
fenomena radikalisne Islan ini. Di antara teori tersebut mengatakan
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bahaa radikalisme agana Jang nrjadi di berbagai belaban duia
nerupakan resistensi agana terhadE l@u nodernisasi dunia. Di A^ria
Tengara, munculnla radikalisme Islan lebib dipicu ohb sikap nkap
perneintab terhadap umat Islam. IWakupun denikian, Jana'ab Ishnjab
tet@ merupakan nisteri; eksistensinla tidak bisa dibuktikan, flctmilrl
fenomenanla ada di nafla-nafla. Banyak pibak akhirnla- 
keberadain Jama'ab kknjab deng,; kiberadaan berLagai puantren
garis keras di Indonesia. Anikel ini berusaba untuk mergidentfrkasi
bubungan antara keberadaan organisasi Jama'ab Islaniyab dengat
kelonpok-kelonpok temrisyng akbir-akbir ini telah memperburuk citra
Islam.
Keywords: Islamic Radicalism, al-Qaeda Jamz'ah Islamiyah, Terorist
Groups, Strucnrral Connection.
A Introduction
In the wake of the September 11 incident, Islamic radicalism
has become a prominent issue across the wodd. Al-Qaeda, a Muslim-
based group, has been alleged to have been tesponsible for the deadly
attacks on the STorld Trade Center CilruC) and the Pentagon miJitary
compound in the United States of America (tlSA).The issue of Islamic
radicalism has intensified in the aftermath of the bomb blast in Bali
Sari Club andJakarta Mardot Hotel, Indonesia. These so-called October
1,2 Q002) and August 5 (2003) incidents respectively have also been
associated with Islamic radicalism, in particular withJama'ah Islamiyahl
0D, u Muslim-based organisation alleged to be part of the al-Qaeda
terrorist network in Southeast Asia and the group responsible for these
two bomb attacks.
Islamic radicalism has drawn the attention of the wodd. Within
the Southeast Asia region itself, the media gave wide coverage to the
issue of Islamic radicalism. A large percentage of the Muslim population
of the world lives in this region, and thus it is an issue of immense
1 The term "Jama'ah Islamiyah" is spelt out differendy. The word 'Jama'ah"
(with letter "a" aftet "i') is given another spelling that is "jema'ah" (with letter "e" after
"i" instead of "a"),just as "Islamiyah" (with letter "y" between "i" and "a') is given
another spelling with dropping "y", that is, "Islamiah". In addressing this organisation
thtoughout the discussion, this paper prefers the way of spelling'Jama'ah Islamiyah"
to'Jema'ah Islamiah" or'Jema'ah Islamiyah".
62 Al-Janihb, Yol. 42, No.1, 200411425 H
Islamic Radicalism
significance in the region. Certainly, al-Qaeda, which is regarded as
the number-one Islamic terrorist Soup in the world, is not based in the
region. However, it has been suggested paniculady by some overseas
governments, such as Singapore, Australia, and the USA, that al-Qaeda
has links with other lzidtcal groups in the region - grouPs said to be
responsible for the bomb attacks in the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia,
and Indonesia. Thus, JI has come to be perceived as connected with
al-Qaeda. It has been associated with two prominent Indonesian
figures, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, who are said to be
its spiritual leaders.
This paper examines Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia in terms
of its roots and the possibility of there being a structural connection
between ndtcal Islamic and terrorist groups. The essay will focus in
particular on JI in Indonesia, but possible links with Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Singapore will also be examined. The paper argues
that the emergence of Islamic radicalism is mainly triggered by the
ruling regime's political measures of marginalisation over Muslim groups
as well as by the global awareness of Muslims. Alsq it is argued that
there seems to be no structural connection among the Islamic radical
groups across the region even though they might have the same vision
and view of their struggles.
To begin udth, the paper explores the roots of Islamic radicalism
in Indonesia. In what follows, it discusses the allegation of the existence
ofJI in Indonesia under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and the
late Abdullah Sungkar. The discussion on JI in Indonesia is followed
with a comparison of the same case in some other Southeast Asian
countries. At the end, the paper challenges the existing view arguing
for the possibility of there being structural connection between Islamic
radical and terrorist groups across the region as theJI net'works.
B. The Roots of Islamic Radicalism
Islamic radicalism has strongly colored the picture of Islam in
contemporary Indonesia. The face of Indonesian Islam is identified
with some radical Muslim-based groups, such as FPI (Front Perabela
Islan/Islamic Defenders Front), MMI (Maielis Mujahidin Indonesiaf
Indonesian Mujahidin Council), LJ (I-^askar Jihad/Jlhad Partmittary
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Troops), and JAMI (lama'ab lkhwan al-Muslimun Indonesia/Indonesian
Ikhwan al-Muslimun Communiry).2 Even though Islamic radical groups
do not have significant numbers in comparison with moderate ones,
such as Nahdlatul Ulama' QrlU) and Muhammadiyah, they can draw
the popular attention. Azyamardi Azn explains these groups are
prominent in the contemporary Indonesian Islam for their literal
religious understanding and ndical actions;3 or in the words of
Noorhaidi Hasan, they spread a "privatised miJitancy".a
Numerous examples demonstrate the radical actions of such
groups. FPI, as described by Azn,s has been involved in a number of
raids and destruction of several caf6s, discotheques, night clubs, gambling
dens, and other socially "bad places", just as LJ has had an intimate
connection to thejibadist actions in Maluku, Ambon and Poso of Central
Sulawesi. In particular reference to LJ, in these conflicting areas, it has
sent its militias to fight against Christians. Meanwhile, the Amir MElis
(the head of the advisory board) of MMI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,is believed
by groups such as Washington-based mtgazine, Time, 'rn its edition
"Confession of an al-Qaeda Terrorist',6I.rue Kuan Yew in his address at
the Conference on Asia Secudty by the Intemational Institute for Strategic
Studies,T and above all by the US Bush administration, to be leadingJl, a
Muslim goup believed to have networks throughout Southeast Asia, in
2 See Azyumatdi Azta, "Agama dan Otentisitas Islam fReligion and the
Authenticity of Islam]," Reptl b li ka, 25 October 2002: hrtp: / /wwvzrepublika.co.idl
kolom detailasp?id=101025&kat id=16(Accessed22October2002);NoorhaidiHasarl
"Faith and Politics: The Rise of the LaskarJihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia,"
Indonuia, no. 73 (April 2002), pp. 745-146.
3 Azra,"Agama dan Otentisitas Islam."
a Hasan, "Faith and Politics," p. 145.
5 Azra,"Agama dan Otentisitas Islam."
u See Timej report "Confession of an al-Qaeda Terrorist," Tine Maga{n (23
September 2002); "Bentuk Triumvirat Bersama Hambali-Jibril: Laporan Akhir Sedrl
'Ba'asyir danJaringan Ngruki (4-Habis)' [Setting Up Triumvirate alongwith Hambali-
Jibril Final report of a sedal Ba'asyir andJaringan N grulrr]1l' Surya 04 November 2002(Accessed 05 November,2002);"Bocoran wawancara Omar al-Faruq [Confession of
Omaral-Farugli JawaPq 25 October2002 (Accessed25 October 2002).7 For details of this matter see SidneyJon es,Al-paeda in SoutbeartAsia Th Case
of the 'I\gruki Netuork" in Indoresia Qakatta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8
August 2002),p.2.
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particular Singapore and Malaysia, andto be allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda'8
Much attention has been given to such Islamic radical groups,
particulady to MMI and LJ. While MMI with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as its
leader, as described by Reyko Huang,e is allegedly responsible for the
unsolved bombings in several places of Indonesia and the Philippines,
LJ is believed to have played a significant role in the worsening of
religious conflicts in several areas of Indonesia. In particular context
of MMI, Indonesian security forces pay much attention to the figure
of Ba'asyir. Having arrested him for the indictment of breaching
immigration rules, the police direct its further investigation of him
into his possible involvement in JI as the Amir Majlis of this alleged
terrodst organisation.lo
To discern the involvement of LJ in such conflicts, in the
meantime, some cornmentators have different views. As an example,
Greg Fealy notes that the sending of the Laskar militias to the areas of
conflict, particularly in Maluku, resulted from the low capacity of the
state to end the conflict and from the finding suggesting that Muslims
were to be driven out from the areas as Protestant churches had plans
to build Christian state consisting of Maluku, Ifest Papua and North
Sulawesi.ll Unlike Fealy, Paul Marshall regards LJ as the responsible
for the aggravation of the conflicts. According to Marshall,tt LJ is the
cause of the deterioration of the conflicts as the coming of LJ militias
8 Al-Qaeda itself emerges having a close relation to the state of W'orld politics as
well as modernism. SeeJohn Gray,Al-pacda andlVbatltMeans to be Modern Q'JewYork:
NewPress,2003).
e Reyko Huang, "Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response," Termism
Proje4SFebnwy 2002: http://wwvzcdi.orglterrorism/sea.cfm (Accessed 14 November
2002).
10 See "PolisiAtahkan Ba'asyir sebagiAmirJI," RePt/blika,29 4pil2004: http:/
/wwvzrepublika.co.id/ASP/koran detail.asp?id=159548&kat id=3 (Accessed 29 April
2004).
11 Greg Fealy, "Inside the LaskarJihad: An Interviev with the Leader of a New,
Radical and Militant Sect," Inside hdonesia, January-March 200I: httP:/ /
wwurinsideindonesia.org /edit65 / fealy.htm (Accessed 1 5 Apttl 2002).
12 Paul Marshall, "Terror's not New to Indonesia," Centerfor Beligious Frudon
(Frudon Houn), 15 October 2002: http://wvtr.freedomhouse.orglreligion/counuy/
indonesia/Terror's%o20Not%o20Nevf/otoTo20lndonesia.htm (Accessed 14 November
2002).
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in Maluku and Sulawesi hindered the attempts of reconciliation
between the conflicting groups. Marshall also points out that LJ had
plans to drive out all Christians and to establish an extreme version of
Islamic law, particulady in Sulawesi.l3
Irrespective of the panicular polemic of LJ involvement in the
conflicts, such reported cases of Islamic radicalism might send a
significant message that religrous radicalism is frequendy followed by
violent actions. As Khamami Zzdzsuggests,la thete is a pamllel connec-
tion bet'ween rcligious radicalism and violence as the radicalism aPpears
in the form of social resistance in accordance to its own religious under-
standing. Zada goes further to say that radicalism has three general
tendencies. First, radicalism is perceived as a response towards the
existing conditions, including assumptions, ideas, values, and
institutions regarded as deviant. Second, radicalism is not restdcted to
the form of such resistance, but also accompanied by an attempt to
change the existing order with another one supposed to be bettet Third,
radicalism is equipped with a strong belief in a certain ideology and
program, which can result in emotional reaction and violence.l5
Even though Islamic radicalism becomes a picture of contem-
porzry Indonesian Islam, some coflrmentators, while tending to come
to the agreement that such Islamic radicalism is a new phenomenon
for Indonesia, relate the phenomenon to the crisis suffered by the
country. According to Noorhaidi Hasan,l6Islamic radicalism, as a new
phenomenon in Indonesia, is inseparable from the so-called multi-
dimensional crisis befalling the country since it started emerging in
13 lbid.
ta KhamzrrtrZad4 "Terorisme dan Radikalisme Agama fferrorism and Religious
Radicalism]," Media Indotuia, l 8 October 2002: http: / /www.mediaindo.co'id/cetakl
beita.asp?id=2D2101802153562 (Accessed 22 October2002).In the case of al-Qaed4
for instance, this organisation has occupied itself with a stfong ideology of violence,
and has set up programs using violence as its political means. For more details, see
Maha Azzam,Al-paeda:Tbe MismderstoodlYahhahi Connection and the Idwhgy of Wolence
(London: The Royal Institute of International Affaits, Briefing Papet no. 1, February
2003).
t5 Zada, "Terorisme dan Radikalisme Agama."
16 Noorhaidi Hasan, "Islamic Radicalism and the Cdsis of the Nation-State,"
ISIM Newsktter, no.'7; http/ /www.isim.nllnewsletter/7/regional/1.html (Accessed
14 November 2002).
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1997 when Soeharto's regime was beginning to collapse. It seems to
Hasan that Islamic radicalism had its moments when the country fell
in the overwhelming crisis.17 In addition,Zada maintains that the fall
of Soeharto provides Islamic radicalism vdth invaluable moments to
accelerate its movement.l8 The change of political leadership in
Indonesia is likely to bdng about the emergence of the alternative
ideology in place of the previous one, and the ideology which seems
to be more accurate to cover the movement of some contemporary
Indonesian Muslims, according to Greg Barton,le is Islamism. The
ideology, as indicated by Barton,2o which believes Islam can and should
form the basis of political ideology can be, to some extent, the
beginning of the Islamic radicalism.
Certainly the post-Soeharto era with its unsolved crises became
a worthy moment for the emergence of the Islamic radicalism. Azra
admits that the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism became more visible
in the post-Soehafto era as the wide coverage of media towards their
actions made their movements more influeniil,.zl Meanwhile, Martin
van Bruinessen, while depicting Islamic radicalism as one of the most
conspicuous new phenomena in contemponty Indonesian Islam,
suggests that such Islamic ndtcalgroups had much Pou/er against the
state authority at the time of the presidency of Abdurrahman r07ahid.22
Btuinessen gives an example that they often gained control of the
streets given the unwillingness of the army and police to restrain them.23
Such analyses on the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia
play an important role in looking at the wider phenomena of Islamic
t1 IUd.
18 See Khamami Zada, Islan Radikal: Petgulatan Omtas-ormas I lam Gais Keras di
Indonuia [Radical Islam: The Struggle of Muslim Radical Organisations in Indonesia].
Qakatta: Teraju,2002), p. 88.!e Greg Barton, "Islamism and Indonesia: Islam and the Contest for Power
after Soehartq" Tbe Rtuiep,September 2002: http: / / www.aliac'otg.au / tevrew / 2002 /
279 /islam-indon.htrnl (Accessed 1 4 November 2002).
n lbid.
2r Azta, "Agama dan Otentisitas Islam."
2 Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Soeharto
Indonesia," South East Asia ksearch 70.2 Q002), p. 118.
,3 lbid.
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radicalism across Southeast Asia as a whole, especially when it has
been already found that some Islamic radicalism in the region have
been interconnected. Indonesia which has been noted for long time as
being occupied by moderate Muslims, and has the world's largest
Muslim population, is now repeatedly claimed by several foreign
governments, such as the US, Singapore and Malaysia, as a countfy
with serious problems of Muslim terrorist and radical groups,
particulady in the aftermath of the bomb blast in Kuta Bali and Marriot
Jakarta. As Fealy points out,2a these goveflrments of foreign countries
claim to have evidence of Indonesians leading offshore terrorist groups
or evidence of terrorists being based in Indonesia, and moreover,
Singaporean senior minister ke Kwan Yew, as indicated by Tenp&s
and Feaf6, claimed that Indonesia was a 'hotbed of terorism'. This
intensifies the significance of analysis ofwhypeople become radicalised
in the middle of the changing socio-political and economic situations
within the course of the nation.
A major reason put forward by critics to deal with the problem
of why people become radical individuals is to do with the nexus of
political repression and crucial socio-economic depdvation. According
to a general view of terrorism, as suggested by Ramakrishna,zT people
become radicalised by this reason. Under this general view, people are
perceived to become radicalised if the government conducts repressive
measures towards the protests and aspirations of the people while it
fails to provide them with economic growth, proper jobs, and affordable
education. From this view, an understanding can be drawn that
radicalism results from two key points: political suppression by the
government and socio-economic downturn.
Such a general view does not seem to be precisely the case in
some Southeast Asian countries, however. Even though political repres-
2a See Greg Fealy, "Is Indonesia a Terrorist B ase? l' Inside Indonerialuly-september
2002: http://wwvdnsideindonesia.orgl edit71lfealyl.htrn (Accessed 19 November2002).
See "Diakah Sang Imam? [s He Its Spiritual kadei.f," Tempo (3 November
2002),p.25.
26 Fealy, "Is Indonesia a Terrorist Base?."
n Kumar Ramakdshna,'Jemaah Islamiah: Aims, Motivations and Possible
Counter-Strategies," Perspectiae, October 2002: http://wwrv.ntu.edu.sg/idss/
Perspective/research 050221.htrn (Accessed 14 November 2002).
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sion and socio-economic decline have been the raison d'etre for Islamic
radicalism in Southeast Asia, there are other factors in the prevalence
of radicalism: globalisatio n and Anbia,. As suggested by Ramakdshna,28
Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia emefges, while in tesponsd to
"political repression" and "poor governance", Ls a resrilt of the global
av/afeness of Muslims in the region of the developments in the Islamic
wodd, which creates anti-American sentiment. From the perspective
of Ramakdshna,2e globalisation is depicted as having poured more fuel
on Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia since Muslims of the region
become ^ware that the problems facing the wider Islamic world tesult
from a biased US foreign policy, while their national govefnments have
not done so much to help change "\Washington's policy mind-set".
Staying with Ramakrishna's idea on the effect of globalisation
on radicalism, Pitsuwan, a Thai Muslim intellectual, adds Atabia as
another factot of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia. According to
Pitsuwan,30 the spread of Islamic radicalism in the region is not only
simply a result of the natural impetus of globalisation, but also an
outcome of the pfospefous charities andindividuals ltomArabia. These
Arabian wealthy charities and individuals dfe believed to make the
seeds of Islamic fundamentalism grow up in the region. While the
wealthy charities from Saudi Arabia and Gulf States have been given
fot more than three decades to fund puritanical schools, mosques and
foundations, as suggested by Pitsuwan,3l the Arab religious activists
have traveled to SoutheastAsia, preaching and teachingWahhabi school
of thought, which is an austere version of Islam.
In short, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is given dse by four
major factors: political repression, poof governance, global awareness'
and Arabia. It is frequendy argued, as reported by the International
28 See Kumar Ramakrishna, "Beware of Pouring Frrel on Radical Embets,"
Perspectiue, September 2002: http: / /www.ntu.edu.sg/idss /Perspective /
research 0502 1 6.htrn (Accessed 14 November 2002).
2' Ibid.
s See "Islam: Look East fot the Answer," Tbe Bulletin' 30 October 2002:hnp: /
/bulletin.ninemsn.com.aulbulletin/EdDesk.nsf/6df5c28ed2c6c605ca256a1500059m3/
ecb398f48c30073cca256c6000801601?OpenDocument (Accessed 4November 2002).
3t Ibid
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Crisis Group (ICG) in its "Indonesia Briefing" section,32 that the New
Order regime's high suppression of political Islam contdbuted to the
radicalisation of Muslim dissent. Meanwhile, Komaruddin Hidayat
holds that religious radicalism is used by the people in response
politically to the poor governance,33 iust as -Lzra rnuntains that the
increase in Islamic radicalism is basically an outcome of the governmeflt
failure to enforce the law and to solve the socio-religous conflicts,
and a result of the abrupt decline of central government authority.3a
Besides political struggle as well as poor governance as the roots,
Bruinessen adds that the present Islamic radicalism in Indonesia results
also from global awareness, which paves the way for the establishment
of transnational Islamic networks.3s In addition, Azra suggests that
Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is closely related to the role of some
Arab descendent figures in the groups of FPI, MM[, and LJ since they
tend to take rigid and rigorous ways instead of persuasive and peaceful
ones to come to their goals.3u Alrq Hefner admits that Islamic radicalism
in Indonesia has come to its prominence with the significant
contribution of financial assistance ftom the SaudiAtabian authorities.3T
Meanwhile, ideological factor plays more significant role in the
rise of Islamic radicalism in Singapore and Malaysia. This is not to say
that political and socio-economic reasons are not the factors of Islamic
radicalism in both countries, but rather to say that this radicalism in
32 Intemational Crisis Group (CG),'lndonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims,"
IndonuiaBiefng 10 october 2001: http://wwuzcrisisweb.orglproiects/asialindonesia/
reports /A400455 10102001.pdf (Accessed 18 November 2002).
33 See interview with Komaruddin Hidayag '?emetintah Tidak Adif Kelompok
Radikal Muncul" [Govemment Doe s Injustice, Radical Group s Emetgef ," Media lndorusia,
3 November 2002: http://wwvzmediaindo.co.idlceak/ bedtaasp?id=20021 0300272506
(Accessed 22 November 2002).
34 See Azra's statement on this matter in "Islam in Modern Indonesia,"
(lJnpublished Conference ProceedingSponsoted by the United States-Indonesia Society
(USINDO) and The Asia Foundation, Washington D.C. ,7 Febtraty 2002) , p. 3.3s Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism," p. 118.36 Azrz, "Agama dan Otentisitas Islam."
37 See Robert !( Hefner, "Globalisation, Governance, and the Crisis of
Indonesian Islam," (lJnpublished paper presented in the conference on Globalisation,
State Capacity, and Muslim Self Determination, Center for Global, International, and
Regional Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, 7 -9 March 2002), pp. 23-24.
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the t'wo places is more ideological. Ramakrishna maintains that the
most impoftant factof and very basic cause of Islamic radicalism, as
represented by the JI extremism, in Singapore and Malaysia arc
ideological, not socio-economic or political.38 All the 31 JI detainees in
Singapore, according to Ramakrishna,3e are not "the children of poverty
and despair", but they are "gainfirlly employed" and own their homes
encompassing deluxe five-room or executive flats. In the matter of
non-socio-economic and political factors of the Islamic radicalism in
Malaysia, the foots can be ttaced to the background of its activists.
Ramakrishna indicates that several leading activists of Islamic ndrcal
groups are the principals of schools, graduates and lecturers of
universities.ao These kinds of iob positions suggest a gainful
employment, and show that the members of Islamic radicalism, who
hold these job positions, occupy an upper level in the commu"ity i"
terms of the socio-economic status.
From the phenomenon of the Islamic radicalism in Indonesia,
there is one significant feature that Islamic radicalism does not apqe t
ftom zero point or without any affihadion to the others. Bruinessen
maintains that Islamic radical groups in Indonesia cunbe traced to two
foots: national and transnational networks.al According to him, while
national nenvorkrefers to two relatively "indigenous" previous Muslim
political movements, the Darul Islam @I) movement and the Masyumi
Pztty,az transnational network refers to a number of such mofe fecent
transnational Islamic links as the sponsor gfoups, which are identified
with Saudi Anbia, Kuwait, and Pakistan.a3
From such a perspective, the DI movement and the Masyumi
Party have inspired the activists of current Islamic Radicalism in
Indonesia, and thus have occupied a certain place in their hearts. Having
been ordered to dissolve itself in early 1960s, accofding to Bruinessenaa
38 Ramakrishna, "Jemaahlslamiah: Aims."
3e lbid.
n lbid.
al Bruinessen, "Genealogies o f Islamic Radicalism," p. 1 1 8.
a lbid.
a3lbid.,p.149.
4 lb id. ,p.722.
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and ICG45, Masprmi transformed its political struggle then intq one
of the things, the missionary efforts among Indonesian Muslims under
the name of the Dewan Dakwab Islanilah Indonesia (DDII/the
Indonesian Dakwab Counci) in 1967 .The two prominent figures, which
are claimed to be leading JI, Ba'asyir and Sungkar, are indicated by
Bruinessena6 to be well connected to DDII circles. Meanwhile,
Bruinessen also indicates that one of the most active Islamic radical
groups, MMI, in which Ba'asyir occupies the leadership position,
encompasses the sections of the DI movement of the foregoing
decades.aT Meanwhile, Hefner points out that among those in MMI
organisation's rank are individuals associated with the DI group.as The
connection of the alleged terrorist organisation,Jl, to the DI movement,
according to Jones,ae has gained justification from the intimate
relationship between Ba'asyir and Sungkar and Kadungga, a son-in-law
of Kahat Muzakkar, the leader of the DI movement in South Sulawesi.
fn sum, globalisation has met with localisation ("glocalisation')
to become nvo contributing factors for Islamic radicalism in Southeast
Asia. Globalisation has raised the awareness of Muslims of the global
situation hctng Islamic wodd. This awareness has generated Muslims'
reaction to the existing situations they face, using lots of their possible
lsligious and financial resources. This condition has been devastated
by the reduced capacity of the state in which Muslims stay, coupled
with socio-economic downturn, to deal with radicalism and violation
within the country.
C. The Issue of Jama'ah Islamiyahin Indonesia
Jarrutah Islamiyah is claimed to be an organisation with an uhimate
goal of establishing a great Islamic state in Southeast Asia, or in the words
as Intemational Crisis Group (ICG), "Indonesia: Violance and Radical."6 Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism," p. 129.
a7 lkd.,p.7M.
a Hefner, "Globalisation, Governance, and the Crisisl'p.27.
ae See interview with Sidney Jones, "Hambali Adalah Petinggi Al-Qaidah
fi'Hambali is t]re Top Figure of al-Qaidah]," Tenpo 3 November 2002),p.53;"Jeiak
Ba'asyir di Sungai Manggis [Ba'asyir's Footsteps in River Manggis]," Tenpo QNovembet
2002),p.28.
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of Gatr4 'Negara Islam Nusantara fNusantara Islamic stat{".t While it is
found to exist for the first time in Malaysia, several Indonesian Muslim
figures are suspected of leading and evolving it. In terms of its first
establishment, according to Umar Al-Faruq, a Kuwait national detained
by CIA for the allegation of being al-Qaeda leader in Southeast Asi451 JI
was established in Malaysia in the beginning of 1980s as a network of the
al-Qaeda organisation. In the case of its accused leaders, however, along
with Al-Farugs' some other commentators, such as Jeremy Zal<tss3 and
Singaporean Senior Minister ke Kwan Yeufa, claim that Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir as well as Riduan Isamuddin (I{ambali) are the key actors of JI,
and many other Indonesian Muslims are the advocates of it. Moreover,
Yew, as described by Al-Anshari,ss states that as long as Ba'asyir is not
captured, Southeast Asia is not a secure place.
As a resuk of the alleged Indonesian Muslim figures behindJl, the
issue of this alleged terrorist organisation in Indonesia has become the
subject of wide debate. The Indonesian prominent figures are suspected
of havingleadingroles in the organisation, and thusJl is presumably thought
to be existing in Indonesia. Commentaries on the issue can be classified
into having two approaches. The first approach sees thatJl really exists in
Indonesi4 just as the second approach views thatJl in Indonesia is only a
fictitious organisation blovm up by the political campaign of other countries.
Both approaches have their ovrn rationale, and thus they give dse to different
consequences in terms of analysis of the alleged terrorist group,Jl.
50 See'Jemaah Islamiyah versi Dokumen Sukohario [Jemaah Islamryah a la
Sukoha{o Document]," Gatra (9 November 2042), p. 29 .
sr See "Mengeiar Siluman [Chasing a Ghost]," Tempo QNovember 2002), p. 36.52 See the agreement of al-Faruq with these commentators on this claim in
"Mengejar Siluman," p. 36.
53 Jeremy Zalas, 
'lnvestigation Begins as Death Toll Reaches 187 in Bali Terrorist
Attach'Idnesia-SpeciatRepon,14October2002:httPt://www.emergenq.com/2002/
bali bomb1002.htrn (Accessed 18 November 2N2);rdem., "ERRI Warns of Jemaah
Islamiyah Involvement in Bali Tertorist Bombings," Bali - SpecialP'epon, 13 October
2002: http://urvw.emergency.com/2002lbali bomb1002.htrn (Accessed 18 Novembet
2002).
5a On ke Kwan Yew claiming this mattet see "Diakah Sang Imam? [s He Its
Spititual Lead et\," Tenpo (3 November 2002), p. 25 -
ss Fatzan Al-Anshari, Sala Terois? (Sebuah '?ledoi") [Am I a Terrorist? (A
Defence)1. (akartz: Republika, 2002), pp. 14-15 -
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The first approach relates the emergence of this organisation to the
auspices of the Indonesian militzry. one of the proponents of this approach,
sidneyJones, as reporre dby Detiknn,s6 says that this organisation in Indo-
nesia, which is allegedly responsible for several terrorist acts in Southeast
Asia, was established by the Indonesian military in the beginning of the
1970s. The establishment of this organisation, according to sidneyJones,sT
was mainly to accommodate the political interests of Muslims in the era
of Soehartq and at the same time to manipulate it as a'rubbersamp' for
labeling Islamic movements fundamentalists. rTith this labeling, ,h.
goveflrmenthad a reason then, as indicated by SidneyJones,ss ro eradicate
and combat the movements that altegedly bring a danger to the counffy.
The evidence exploited by such an ^ppto^ch to convince the
existence of JI in Indonesia is taken from the District court documenrs,
ftom which the term 'Jzma'ahlslamiyah" was found in Indonesia for the
first time. As SidneyJonesse and Asep chaerudin@ explicitly suggesg the
term'Jamz'ah Islamiyah" did not appear to be found in the court documents
until the 1980s, one of the things is the sleman District document under
the tide 'Berkas Perkara Tersangka Abdullah Sungkar [case Document
of the Alleged Abdullah sungkar]".61 However, according to Terrpo,@ there
is another court document found eadier than the document of Sungkafs
trial to support the claim of the presence ofJI in Indonesia. This document
is the Medan District court document o f 197gon charges of Gaos Taufilq
56 See "Jemaah Islamiyah Dibentuk oleh Mliter Indonesia? [sJemaah IslamiyahEstablished by Indonesian Military?fl' Detikcon, 13 Auglst 2002: htrp:/ /
www. detik. com /peristiwa / 2002 / 08 / 1 3 / 200208 1 3-0558 1 2. Jhtml (Accessed 06
November2002).
51 See lbid.
58 IUd
_ 
se See SidneyJones, Al-paeda in soutbeastAsia: Tbe case of the 'Ttdgnki Network',
in Indonuia flakarta/Brussels: International crisis Group, g August zoozl,p. e .@ Asep Chaerudin, "CounteringTransnational Terroris-]tt Soottt ^.iA.i"*ittt
Respect to Tenodsm in Indonesia and the philippines," (MA Thesis, Naval postgraduate
Scholt Monterey, Califomia, December 2003), p. 33.6r In this document, it is told the term 'Jama'ahlslamiyah" was delivered by
Abdullah Sungkar to call his organisation. Sungkar informed the court that as he goi
infolmation from newspaper that the members of Jama'ah Islamjabhavebeen detained
in Medan, he was certain.to go to Pondok Ng*ki for security'reason. SeeJones,l/-
Qaeda in So*heastAsia, p.6-62 See "Diakah Sang Imam?," p. 25.
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the leader of Konando Jibad [thad Command), which states, as reported
by Tempo,63 that Taufik had taken Abdullah Umar's oath of l"yulty toJI in
establishing a state based on Islamic law From this evidence, it is clearly
shown that the term'Jarn'ah Islamiyah" is recognised for the first time
through the documents of the courg which contain charges on the alleged
figures of Islamic radicalism.
The first approach which sees JI located in Indonesia has been
ctiticised, however, as being "ethnocentric". The evidence to shour the
existence ofJI solely through the court document without any sufficient
investigation tou/afds political atrnosphefe of the time is believed to be
misleading. Supriyono, a senior journalist of the Indonesian daily
newspapef, Rcpilbliks, ctiticises such an approach, saying that the allegation
of JI to exist in Indonesia based only upon the finding of the term 
'Jama'ah
Islamiyah" from the court document of the trial pfocess of the late
Abdullah Sungkar needs to be further investigated. This is because, as
suggested by Supriyonq the emergence of the term resulted only ftom the
indictrnents of the pfosecutof in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.ft Any
reference to the political cases of Muslims at this period, according to
Supriyonq65 must be carefully conducted with an analpically close and
cafefi.il observation of the political relations of Islam and the state in
which the New Order regime conducted vefy stfong political repression
on Muslims. under this political repression, the indictment of the
pfosecutof, as apparent in other cases, is likely to be with collusion of the
state intelligence body. The tnal of the late Abdullah Sungkar at this period
went under this situation with the result that the term 'Jana'ahlslamiyah",
as indicated by Supriyono,66 might ^ppe r in Sungkafs confession under
the direction of the state intelligence body.
63 lbid.
a See Supriyono's critique in "Liputan Media Tentang Bali: ManaJutnalisme
Mana Propaganda? fMedia Report on Bali: BetweenJournalism and Pr_opaganda],"
(Seminar Froieeding by ISAIflnstitut StadiAraslrfornasi/The Institue of Informadon
d*r.rrt,studies] aidMEatahPantaulPantailMagazrne),Jakarta,7-8November2002),
posted on to themailing list of Indonesian Muslim Student Association in Australia,
Minaret Minaret@anu.edu.au (Accessed 20 November 2002).
65 lbid.
66 lbid.
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In contrasg the second approach argues that the political campaign
of other countries and the familiarity of its name are responsible for the
view of JI in Indonesia as a fictitious organiation. Some rndonesian
commentators tend to follow this approactt" maintaining that as a Muslim
organisation,Jl is not well recognised by Indonesians Most of Indonesians
have no prior knowledge pf the existence of this organisation. Alfitra
Salamm, a researcher from Itmbaga Ilnu Pengetabuan Irdonesia (I-IH/
Indonesian Institute of Science), for example, states tlrat JI is not a rca\
but only a fictitious organisation set up by Malaysia and Singaporean
govefirments to silence the criticism of Islamic radical groups in their
respective countries.6T
Some other Indonesian prominent cofirmentators are in sympathy
with this approach. As reported by Rcpubkk8 and Gatrfe, figures such as
Nurcholish Madiid, a leading Indonesian Muslim intellectual, Deliar Noor,
a political scientisg Dien syamsudirq the Secretary General of MUI (ME'etis
Ukna Indnnesia/Indonesian Muslim Scholar Council), Ibrahim Ambong
a member of Indonesian Parliameng and Riza Sihbudi, a researcher of
LIPI, are convinced thatJl is not recognised *roughout the history of
Indonesian Islam. The report of Repubkka elaborates firther that while
Sihbudi views that Indonesia has a Muslim or,ganisation with the name
'lslamJama'ah" rather than'Jama'ah Islamiyah", Ambong holds thatJl is
based and operates in Malaysia and Singapore, not in Indonesi4 even
though its alleged leading figures might be from IndonesiaT' The Indonesian
govefnment also tends to dismiss the issue of theJl presence in the country
as indicated by its Defense Minister, Matori Abdul Djalil ,Jzlma,ah
Islamiyah only exists in singapore and trzfalaysia-7l The Indonesian police
67 See interview with Alfitra Salamm, '?eneliti LIPI: JI Organisasi Maya Buatan
Malaysia dan Singapura IJPI's Researcher: JI Fictitious organisation by Malaysia and
Sngapote]l' Detiknn,3O October2002hW:./ /www.deikcom/penstrwa/2002/70/30/
20021030-06542l.shtnl (Accessed 06 November 2002); "Jama'ah Islamiyah yang cuma
Bualan [amaah lslamiyat\ on]y dre Frame-up]," hrutu Keadilarno 3 (l0 Novernber N\,p. 1,6.6'Berikumya: Parai-parai Islam [Nexr Islamic Pames],', Repubtika28 Octbber
2002: http://wwwrepublika.co.idlcetak detail.asp?id=101455&kat id=3 (Accessed 6
November2002).
6e'Jemaah Islamiyah versi Dokumen Sukoharjo," p. 30.
70 lhid.
71 See "Mengejar Siluman," p. 37.
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also admit the difficuky in proving the existence of JI in Indonesia, as
stated by a top-level policeman at the time of investigating this organisation:
'lWe acts like chasing a siluman (ghost)".72
Several Indonesian figures are the subjects of such allegations
based on the dubious argument. This is certainly if the parameter used
to relate the organisation ofJI in Southeast Asia to Indonesian figures
is only based on the governmental claims and the confession of
detainees,In Malaysia, for example,JI, as reported by Tlte Mak1Mail,13
was claimed to be established by nvo Indonesian clerics, Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir and Riduan a.k.a. Isamuddin Hambah, at the time of their
status of exile in Malaysia. JI is allegedly to exist through the Kampalan
Militan Maklsia (KMI\!, an organisation regarded, according to The
Malal Mail,Ta as the offshoot or the local branch ofJI, which had plans
to establish a pan-Islamic state including Indonesia, Singapore, southern
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
The allegation of there being links between KMM and JI has
also been made by the Singaporean government. According to Fealy,Ts
like in Malaysia, officials in Singapore claimed there were links between
the t'wo organisations. This allegation was followed by the arrest of
several figures in the period of mid 2001 to earlry 2002. All the
detainees, according to Internal Security Department (ISD) of
Singapore,T6 confessed that four Indonesian Muslim figures, such as
Ba'asyir, Hambali, AbuJibril or Mohammad Iqbal bin Abdul Rahman,
and Fuz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, are their JI leaders.
The association of JI and Indonesian figures is also very much
traceable to the background of the JI detainees in Malaysia and the
Philippines. SThile among the JI detainees in Malaysia is Mohammad
72 lbid.
73 See "Bali Bombings: Mastermind with Local Links," The Malal Mail, 19
November 2002: http : / /wwrv.mmail.com.mylCurrent News /MM /Monda]'/
Frcnrpage / 2N27718094632 (Accessed 1 9 November 2002).
74 lbid.
7s Fealy, 'Is Indonesia a Tetrorist Base?."
76 See "Stempel JI dari Singapura pabel of JI from Singaporcf," Tenpo (10
November 2002),37; 'Jeiak Ba'asyir di Sungai Manggis [Ba'asyir's Footsteps in River
Manggis]," Tenpo Q Novembet 2002),p.30.
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Iqbal, an Indonesian figure who was captured in late 2001,77 some of
the JI detainees in the Philippines are also Indonesian figures. Fathur
Rahman al-Ghozi, a former student at Ba'asyir's boarding school, who
was detained in January 2002 on charges of importing explosives and
involvement in several bomb attacks throughout the region, as reported
by ERR[,78 for example, is an Indonesian Muslim as well. In mid-March
2002,thtee other Indonesian Muslims -lTamsil Linrung, AbdulJamal
Balfas and Agus Dwikarna- were also arrested, as described by Fealy,Te
on charges of smuggling C4 explosive in their luggage, even though
the latter t'wo figures were finally discharged in mid-April for lack of
evidence.
The problem with such a way of association ofJI with Indonesian
figures, however, centers around the question "is the confession of
detainees reliable enough to be the evidence while they give so under
the interrogation by the investigating officers?". This problem has gained
confirmed justification from the experience of the two alleged Islamic
ndtcal groups, KMM in Malaysia and the Konando Jibad in Indonesia,
that they were set up and then framed by the regimes to suppress the
resrugence of Islamic groups in the respective countries. KMM proved,
as indicated by Salamm,e to be fictitious, which was set up by the
Malaysian Mahathir administration. Likewise, the Komando Jibad was
invented and engineered, as indicated by Jones8l and Bruinessens2, by
Ali Murtopq the head of the state Intelligence bodyin the era of Soeharto.
D. The Structurd Connection of Islamic Radical and Terrorist
Groups in Southeast Asia
The problem of associating JI with Indonesian figures is also
closely intertwined with the problem of the possible structural
t Fealy, "Is Indonesia a Terrorist Base?"
78 ERRI @,mergency Response and Research Institute), "Multiple Bombings in
the Philippines; 14 Dead and More than 50 Wounded," CtmntPhilippine ltkndsAdyisoiu
ardAnallsis,2l Apn12002: http://v\rqzemergency.com/ philwarn.htm (Accessed 18
November2002).
7e Fealy, 'Is Indonesia a Terrorist Base?."
s See'Jamaah Islamiyah yang Cuma Bualan," p. 16.
81 'Jemaah Islamiyah versi Dokumen Sukoharjo," p. 30.
82 Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism,"pp. 128-129.
78 Al-Janihh, Yol. 42, No.1, 200411425 H
Islamic Radicalism
connection among the Islamic tadtcal. groups across Southeast Asia,
particulady inside Indonesia. Indonesianists, as suggested by Barton,83
are divided into two main groups of opinions in assessing the threat of
Islamic radicalism in the country by the form of stfuctufal connections.
Fifst, some observers, according to Barton,so uW" that as a result of
the dysfunctional nature of much of the state apparatus, the making
of sttuctural connections of Islamic radical gfoups acfoss the country
and the wider world cannot be avoided. JI, as suggested by Huang,85 is
the subject of this opinion; it having been suspected of being a terrorist
network, that is regional in focus but global in association. Second,
some other observers, as described by Barton,86 argue that there is
Iitde hard evidence to support the charges of structural connections
of Islamic ndtcal and terrorist grouPs in local affaks.
To come to the firm understanding on the possibility of there
being structural connections, especially across Indonesia, the issue of
how to have a reliable perception in understanding the term'Jatrn'ah
Islamiyah" needs to be considered carefully. This is because differing
perceptions have occurred. Some observers discern the term as the
name of the alleged terrorist organisation while others depict it as only
the concept of the entity of Islamic values or community. From the
reported data in media, it seems that those from outside Indonesia
tend to give a meaning to the term as a name of organisation, which is
claimed to have created sevetal cases of terrorism acfoss Southeast
Asia. The governments of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the
USA, Austra)ir,tl andeven the United Nations with its Security Council
Resolution 7267 and 1.33388 have claimed JI as a n me of terrorist
organisation. Above all, it is clear from the declaration of Singaporean
Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew, as reported by Tenpo,se thatJl is claimed
83 Barton, "Islamism and Indonesia."
u lbid.
E5 Huang, "Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia."
e Barton, "Islamism and Indonesia."
87 See 'Jemaah Islamiyah versi Dokumen Sukohario," p. 29.
s 
"Menyelusuri Jefak Jamnh Islamiyah ffracing the Footsteps of Jamaah
Islamiyah]," Tenpo (4-l}November 2002)' p. 25.
8e lbid
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to be the name of the alleged terrorist organisation in Southeast Asia.
However, there seems to be only one political leader, namely Abdul
Hadi bin Haji Avrang, the president of the PAS opposition party of
Malaysia, who admittedly did not hear, as reported by Tempo,n the name
'JI" so far zs an organisation in Malaysia.
Meanwhile, those from inside Indonesia tend to understand the
term as the Arabic-origm term for the concept of 'lslamic Community''
or "Islamic values", which denotes the community of believers of Islam
as a whole. According to the director of Ba'asyir's Pesantren Ngtuki,
Wahyuddin,";I is a concepq not a name of organisaaon. Tempoez also
reports that the term 'JI" provides the meaning of 'Tslamic community''
which implies that Indonesian Muslims who reach the maiority number
of the country population are included in its scoop of meaning. If the
term 'JI" is meant as the name of the alleged terrodst organisation,
Indonesian Muslim community has to be within ig and thus it is too
loose. Certainly, for this perspective, understandi"g JI as a name of
organsiation as such is dubious for the absence of clear-cut definition
of the meaning of 'JI". It is required, as indicated by Tenrpo,e3 therefore,
that those who claimJl as an International terorist organisation glve a
clear-cut and detailed definition of the organisation. Otherwise, it can
create a loose definition and arbitrady apply to all Muslim communities
across Southeast Asia. In line with the perception onJI as a concept of
Islamic community,Jones maintains that in the period of end 1970s to
early 1980s, the term 'JI" had different meanings.ea As an example, for
Ba'asyir, the term, according to Jones,es hard a, specific meaning, that
is, the entity of Muslims to revive Islamic values in Indonesia. Even
though it implied a political aspect of meaning, the intended
interpretation of the term did not indicate any kind of organisation,
s 
"Balada Sang Pendakwah di Negeri Sembilan flhe Ballad of the Pteacher in
Negeri Sembilanl :' nnpo (l0November 2fi)2), p 30.
st 
"Dari Ngruki, Dia Bermimpi [From Ngruki, He Dreams],- Tenpo (10
November 2002),p.32.
e2'1\,IenyelusuriJejakJamaah IslqmiyalL" p. f,S.
e3 lkd
ea See interviewwithJones, "HambaliAdalah Petinggl" p 53.
e5 lhid.
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and moreover, there was at that time, according toJones,e6 the absence
of nicely structufed organisation with a great influence ofl others.
From such an explanation, it seems that there is no firm definition
of the term 'JI". Those who claim JI as a teffofist organisation only
disclose, as suggestedby Tenpo)? a loose organisation which is claimed
to include several gfoups of Muslims with the spifit to establish Islamic
caliphate in Southeast Asia. This claim is so slack and arbitrary that all
Islamic radical groups, which afe suspected of establishing Islamic
caliphate, can be included in the connection of this organisation. The
crucial problem arising from this loose and atbitaty claim is do the
Islamic radical gfoups acfoss the region, fegardless of the name and
the vision, have structural connection to each other? If the connection
is meant for the making of communication among the activists of
Islamic radical groups, it might be right that the connection is there. A
Tempo investigation provides evidence that much communication and
contact has occurred bet'ween Ba'asyir and sorne other figures who
eventually proved to be involved in a number of incidents of radicalism
and violen ce.ea Tempo fepofts further that while Ba'asyir has made
contacts with some suspected figures responsible for several bomb
attacks on a church in 1984 and on Borobudur temple in 1985 as well
as for the failed bomb attack on Kuta beach 1985, he also has kept in
touch with such alleged International terrorist figues as Hambali,
Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi" and Fikiruddin Muqti.D
However, if such intended connection is to be dealt with things
in terms of stfuctufe, mofe and careful investigation needs to be
undertaken. There are different opinions on the possibility of there
being suuctural connections of Islamic radical and terrorist groups.
The opinion which afgues for there being structural connection among
them tends to be presented by, among them, SidneyJoneslm and Asep
Chaerudinl0l maintaining that there might be a structural connection
e6 lhid.
e? 
"1\,[enyelusu iJeiakJanazhlslamiyall' p. 25-
e8 See "Diakah Sang Imam?," P. 25.99 lbid
rm Interview with Jones, "Hambali Adalah Petinggi," p. 54'101 Cheerudin, "CounteringTransnationalTerrorismj' pp' 36-39.
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between Islamic radical goup andJl on the one hand, and bet'weenJI
and al-Qaeda on the other, tkough Hambali, who is suspected to be
the operator of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. To support her conviction,
Jones uses the confession of some detainees in Malaysia as well as the
intelligence document and some journalist investigations as the
evidence.lo2 Due to the presented evidence, some people are still
doubtful about such structural connections, however. Tejq for example,
puts in doubt the possibility of there being structural connecrions,
sinceJones'paper on the'Ngruki" connection does not give any clue
of why the issue of JI suddenly appears in Southeast Asia.103 The only
description given byJones,l@ according to Tejq is that "...while the
Darul Islam members certainly talked in terms of establishing Islamic
communities in a generic sense, the government prosecutors offered
litde hard evidence that the Jenaab Islanfrah was in fact xr organisation
with an identifiable leadership."los
From such arguments, it seems that the existing hard evidence
does not frrlly suppott there being structural connection of Islamic
ndtcal goup and terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. Therefore, such
an opinion that puts in doubt the possibility of there being structural
connection is relatively more accepable so far than that arguing fot
Having rnade a lot of contacts and communications as well as having
kept in touch with other Islamic leaders does not mean that the figure
has made a structural connection with them in his struggle. As
suggested by Salamm,t* JI ar an organisation is rczlhy a frame-up as
the structural connection which implies a form of organisation does
not seem to be there.
Finally, the thought of JI as only a fictitious organisation has
stronger indications so far - this is not to say that Islamic radical and
102 Interview withJones, "Hambali Adalah Petinggi," p. 54.
r03 See Bimo Ario Teio,'JI Organisasi Fiktif? [fI, Fictitious Organisation?],"
Posted on to the mailing list of Indonesian Muslim Student Association in Canberta
- Australia [Minaret],02 November 2002: Minare@.anu.edu.au (Accessed MNovember
2002).
1M Jones, Al-paeda ir Soutlxast Asia, p. 6.tot T.iO 'JI Organisasi Fiktif?."
ttr See "Jamaah Islamiyah yang Cuma Bualan," p.'1,6.
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Islamic terrorist groups do not have any presence - than the idea of
JI as a real name of organisation of some Islamic radical gtoups in
Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. First, JI appeared for the ftst
time in Malaysia, as reported by the local media, while Malaysian media
were themselves, as indicated by Salamm,l07 hegemonised and undet
control of the regime. As a result, any report or allegation of radical
social groups, such as KMM, according to Salamm,1o8 is only the
invention of the regime. Second, in Indonesia the term 'JI" appearcd,
as described above, from the indictments of the trial processes in some
district courts in late 1970s and early 1980s. In this period, the New
Order regime was in its highest power with the result that it could gain
control of any resrrgence of Islamic groups. One of the examples was
the Konando Jihad wlttch was, according to Jonesloe and Bruinessenll0,
engineered and invented by the state Inlslligence body under the
leadership of Ali Murtopo.
E. Conclusion
The phenomenon of Islamic radicalism has been quite prominent
in the regional development of Southeast Asia. It has been frequently
associated with some Indonesian Muslim figures. As a result, Indonesia
turns to be the subject of the allegation of the hotbed of radicalism
and terrorism. rVhile Islamic radicalism in general is brought about by
the combination of political repression and crucial socio-economic
deprivation, in Southeast Asia other contributing factors include
globalisation and "/:rabia" support. These four factors have also
contributed to the rise of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. Also, in this
country Islamic radicalism appears in connection to two main roots:
the national bonds tracing back to the previous Islamic movement and
parry in the early history of Indonesia, and the transnational networks
referring to a number of recent transnational Islamic links as the sponsor
gfoups.
101 lbid.
t08 lbid.
10e See "Jemaah Islamiyah versi Dokumen Sukohario," p. 30.
1 10 Bruines sen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism,"p p. 128-129.
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However, there is still doubt about the possibiJiry of there being
structural connections between Islamic ndtcal, and terrorist groups.
Even though some Islamic radical groups might share the common
vision and view of their struggles, the existing hard evidence does not
firlly support there being structural connections of Islamic radical group
and terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the idea that puts in
doubt the possibility of there being suuctural connecrions is relatively
more reliable so far than that arguing for. This is because having made
much contact is not automatically the same as having made a structural
connection. Without any pretension to saylng that Islamic radical and
terrorist groups do not have any presence in Southeast Asia, especially
in Indonesia, the thought of JI as only a fictitious organisation has
stronger hints so far than the idea ofJI as a real name of organisation
of some Islamic radical groups.
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